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Digital assets are hot right now. Whether cryptocurrencies,
like bitcoin, or initial coin offerings and tokens, this new asset
class has captured the imagination of American investors.
While it remains to be seen if this phenomenon has staying
power, there is no doubt that these assets and their promoters
have attracted the attention of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. But neither Congress nor the SEC has formally
elucidated which digital assets are securities and which are
not.
This Article seeks to provide clarity in determining which
digital assets are securities. It proposes two tests that
operationalize the Supreme Court’s test in SEC v. W. J. Howey
Co. The first test is the Bahamas Test, which asks whether a
digital asset is sufficiently decentralized such that it is not a
security. The second test is the Substantial Steps Test which is
used to determine whether an investment is made with an
expectation of profit. This Article takes a rules-based approach
to provide clarity and begin a conversation about crafting more
predictable jurisprudence and regulation in this area.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Something potentially revolutionary is going on in the
capital markets. Not since the Internet Bubble of the late
1990s has there been such growth in new ways of raising
money, coupled with such widespread public interest in new
financial products.
It began with crowdfunding.1 Entrepreneurs of all kinds
realized they could use the Internet to appeal directly to
investors or even their customers. This realization created a
new market for funding ideas: the crowd. And while the
market boomed for a bit, there were no clear and stable rules.
The securities laws in place were, and still are, a product of
the 1930s. Even though the laws have been continuously
updated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
through rulemaking and guidance, this new approach to
fundraising did not fit neatly into the regulatory scheme. The
whole point of crowdfunding was to find a less expensive way
of raising money. Forcing entrepreneurs to use existing, highcost registration methods was incompatible with the concept.

1 Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, Some Simple
Economics of Crowdfunding, 14 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON 63 (2014).
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But a regulatory Wild West was not appealing either. 2 There
was a risk of fraud, and also the possibility that low-quality
offerors and offers would crowd out higher quality ones.
Unfortunately, Congress and the SEC addressed the
regulatory lacuna with a new set of rules that may not have
been passed during the New Deal, but were certainly wedded
to its precepts. To avail oneself of crowds to raise money,
entrepreneurs had to navigate complex rules and use
investment portals registered with the government.3 Not
surprisingly, corporate crowdfunding has not yet evolved into
a serious alternative source of financing.4
The latest evolution in capital markets is cryptocurrency
and other digital assets, which are addressed in this brief
Article. Today, digital assets present both promise and peril,
which makes the space similar to crowdfunding in the early
2010s. In both cases, there has been no shortage of investor
demand for new classes of assets or ways to participate in
capital markets. Similarly, there has been no shortage of
entrepreneurs who want to provide the public with those
assets. There is, however, a shortage of intelligent rules and
regulations that provide a clear and predictable framework for
investors, issuers, and their lawyers.
This shortage of regulatory certainty is, for some, a feature
of digital assets. The high costs of accessing public markets in
the United States has driven capital elsewhere—going public
costs millions of dollars on average, and operating a public
company has significant ongoing costs.5 While the
2 But see generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO
WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER (2004) (exploring how
the Wild West was not as lawless as commonly portrayed, and had a stable
institutional environment that encouraged cooperation and trade).
3 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012); 17 C.F.R. pt. 227 (2018).
4 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed
Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions,
and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865
(2013).
5 PWC DEALS, CONSIDERING AN IPO TO FUEL YOUR COMPANY’S FUTURE?:
INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC AND BEING PUBLIC 14 (2017),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MV65-MEV9] (“Two-thirds of the CFOs surveyed
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government has responded with legislation aimed at
promoting access to capital markets, such as the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),6 there is still
demand for lesser-regulated, publicly-available investment
products that is not matched by supply of those products. This
demand is just one of many reasons for the increase in
investment in digital assets, which include cryptocurrencies,
initial coin offerings (“ICOs”), and other instruments.
Another driver of this market is innovation, both
technological and sociological. On the technological side,
innovations like blockchains have made it possible to
disintermediate financial and other institutions.7 These
networks and the currencies that fuel them have value.
Bitcoin is the most famous example of this—it is the modern
world’s first and most successful experiment in a
decentralized approach to money creation. There is growing
demand for a digital-age money or a private store of value,
which may in turn be fueling a demand for other private
services that the state has traditionally policed. Whatever the
reasons, once there is a private store of value—whether it is
mackerel fillets,8 cigarettes,9 or bitcoin—it is natural for
individuals to use it as a means of fundraising or investing.
ICOs follow from bitcoin as IPOs follow from dollars.
On the sociological side, individuals are rethinking how
they interact with capitalists and entrepreneurs. The success
of crowdfunding prior to regulation showed that individuals
estimated spending between $1 million and $1.9 million annually on the
costs of being public[.]”).
6 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012); see also H.R. REP. No. 113-53 (2013) (proposing the SEC
Regulatory Accountability Act).
7 See, e.g., David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21
REV. FIN. 7, 10 (2017) (“Making such powerful third parties obsolete and
disintermediating financial transactions was the central goal of Nakamoto’s
(2008) proposal for a peer-to-peer electronic cash system.”).
8 Justin Scheck, Mackerel Economics in Prison Leads to Appreciation
for Oily Fillets, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB122290720439096481 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
9 See generally R.A. Radford, The Economic Organisation of a P.O.W.
Camp, 12 ECONOMICA 189, 190–91 (1945).
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are willing to participate in equity raises with mixed motives
that include not only profit seeking, but also consumptive
utility and charitable satisfaction. In a world in which social,
environmental, political, and other attributes attach to
investments, as well as an individual attachment between
investors and the companies they provide capital to, there
may be a need for new financial vehicles to satisfy this more
nuanced demand.
A final reason for the changing capital formation landscape
is fraud and exuberance. As with any new technology, digital
assets have opened the door for both bad and irrational actors.
Vast amounts of money funneling into the space have created
ripe conditions for a get-rich-quick mentality on the part of
investors and cases of outright fraud on the part of promoters.
There are already numerous examples of both. 10
Therefore, digital assets pose two fundamental problems to
securities regulators. The first is an information asymmetry
problem; the second is a police power problem. Information
asymmetries are the animating force behind most securities
regulation. The three pillars of modern securities law—
mandatory disclosure, strict anti-fraud rules, and insider
trading limitations—are designed to put traders on an equal
footing, regardless of whether they are inside or outside of a
particular firm whose stock is being traded.11 This follows
from the reality that market forces will not provide the
optimal amount of information, and so the government must
instead compel it. The antifraud rules in turn are designed to
make any disclosures credible.
The argument goes that in the absence of a way for issuers
to vouch for their disclosures, the market will have a “lemons”
10 See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014); Michelle Fox, People are Taking Out Mortgages
to Buy Bitcoin, Says Securities Regulator, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/11/people-are-taking-out-mortgages-to-buybitcoin-says-joseph-borg.html [https://perma.cc/4Q67-L2R4].
11 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)) (“To provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof,
and for other purposes.”).
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problem.12 After all, if fraudsters can make promises as easily
as upstanding issuers, then good firms will leave the market
because investors will confuse them with bad actors. If
opportunities for fraud and exuberance are the primary
drivers of these new digital asset markets, then the SEC has
an important role in making these markets credible and
efficient.
The second issue is that even if investors have perfect
knowledge of the assets they are purchasing, the government
may still wish to prohibit purchase of these instruments. Such
prohibitions can have any number of rationales, including
national security, tax enforcement, or paternalism. States use
their “police power” to stop gambling and a host of other
activities they deem socially undesirable.13 The line between
legitimate investment and illegal gambling is indeed hazy and
often depends on social or moral judgments. After all, the
moral difference between betting on whether the Chicago
Bears will make the playoffs and betting on whether General
Electric will make their earnings target for the next quarter
is slight. Why the latter is universally permitted and the
former only in limited circumstances is likely because of a
view by government regulators that betting on stocks is “good”
for society, while betting on sports and so on is “bad” for
society. But, it is notable that this police power is not
primarily enforced through securities laws. Gambling is
banned by other laws, with the securities laws, in effect,
providing a safe harbor for trading in stocks and bonds.
It is still too early to tell exactly which of the drivers of
digital asset excitement is dominant. This puts regulatory
bodies in a tough position. Specifically, these new assets pose
a problem for the SEC. More lax regulation of digital assets
may give cover to bad actors, while the good actors are forced
to contend with antiquated securities regulations. There has
been a huge proliferation of digital assets, and both those
products and the markets that trade them are changing

12 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
13 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1101–09 (West 2012).
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rapidly. It is unclear when and if this space will stabilize, but
the reality is that digital assets as traded and marketed today
do not fit into the regulatory dogmas of the quiet past.
The SEC has entered into the fray largely through
enforcement actions, consent orders, and informal guidance.14
It has not, however, announced a rule-based, operational test
for determining whether a digital asset is a security
(“investment contract”) under Sections 2(a)(1) and 3(a)(10) of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”).15 This lack of
a bright-line rule maintains discretion and flexibility for
regulators.
To this end, on April 3, 2019, the SEC’s Strategic Hub for
Innovation and Financial Technology issued its Framework
for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets (the
“Framework”).16 It is not “Auer” job to determine how much
weight to give the Framework.17 Instead, this Article will note
the strong overlap its analysis has with the Framework.18

14 See, e.g., CarrierEQ, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10575, 2018 WL
6017664 (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/3310575.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM4X-66VV]; Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities
Act Release No. 10574, 2018 WL 6017663 (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10574.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TJ3D-93DL].
15 See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2(a)(1), 3(a)(10).
16 Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[hereinafter
Framework],
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysisdigital-assets [https://perma.cc/99KD-XG4P] (last modified Apr. 3, 2019).
17 See Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied,
880 F.3d 1378 (2018), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (granting certiorari
to review whether the Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997) and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), two
cases that direct courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
its own ambiguous regulation).
18 An initial draft of this paper was published on October 17, 2018. See
M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital
Assets: Towards an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs,
and Other Digital Assets (Oct. 17, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265295 [https://perma.cc/L5AK-NCUW];
cf.
Leibniz-Newton
Calculus
Controversy,
WIKIPEDIA,
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Where the Article primarily differs is in its proposal of a
simple, rules-based test that will provide more certainty to the
market.19 Such a test would not tie regulators’ hands with
respect to ex post enforcement actions, preserving regulatory
flexibility.
This test will proceed under the existing SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co. framework, which the Supreme Court and the SEC
use to evaluate the jurisdictional sections of the relevant
securities statutes. Howey established that:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby
a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical
assets employed in the enterprise.20

Simply stated, the four prongs of the Howey test that must
be met for jurisdiction are: (1) investment of money; (2) efforts
of others; (3) expectation of profits, and (4) common
enterprise.21
This Article’s two-step proposal offers a first cut at how
digital assets of various types might be categorized within this
familiar Howey framework. One part of the test will be
immediately useful and operational—called the “Bahamas
Test” herein. It makes a determination of whether a digital
asset is sufficiently decentralized such that it does not satisfy
the “efforts of others” prong of Howey and is therefore not a
security. The second part of the test, determining whether an
asset satisfies the “expectation of profit” prong of Howey,
reveals the problems with applying the existing framework to
ICOs and other digital assets.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leibniz%E2%80%93Newton_calculus_contro
versy [https://perma.cc/Y339-SKWR].
19 It is beyond the scope of this Article to defend such an approach. For
such a defense, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
20 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
21 See id.
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Some tokens and cryptocurrencies—such as bitcoin—exist
on decentralized, open source and permission-less platforms
where there are no “others” to satisfy the final prong of the
test, even though they may be purchased with the expectation
of profit. These are not securities under the traditional Howey
test, and in our view, they should not be regulated as such.
The challenge comes in differentiating between digital
assets and tokens that have been described as “utility” or
“consumptive” tokens with those that have been described as
“investment” tokens. The currently existing spectrum is
between purely consumptive assets, mixed-motive assets, and
purely investment assets. This has analogues in case law—
one simple example is a concert venue that sells tickets to a
reseller who has no intention of using them other than to sell
to the final consumers. This is not treated as issuance of a
security.22
This Article’s goal is to start—not end—the conversation
about how to categorize crypto and other digital assets. The
proposed “Substantial Steps Test”—to determine whether a
purchase is made with an expectation of profit—is not without
its faults and may militate towards a full rethinking of Howey.
This Article begins with a brief description of the
mechanics of digital assets and their limited regulatory
history. It then turns to our proposed Howey test for digital
assets and examines a handful of cases under the two prongs.

II. A BRIEF TECHNICAL ASIDE
This Section provides a brief background on digital assets.
The goal here is to provide a framework that will animate the
regulatory analysis, not to give an encyclopedic account of
these assets.
The Section begins with the concept of open source
software. The hallmark of open source software is that it has
little to no intellectual property protections.23 The code can be
copied and modified, and no legal recourse exists to the
creator. A plethora of open source licenses append to software
22
23

Other examples include personal seat licenses and condominiums.
See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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programs. Bitcoin uses the MIT License, 24 while Ethereum
uses the Free Software Foundation’s License.25 Bitcoin’s
license grants permission, free of charge, “to use, copy, modify,
merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the
[Bitcoin software.]”26
Individuals are free to run whatever versions of Bitcoin or
Ethereum software they choose to run. Through network
effects, however, consensus is formed and dominant versions
of software emerge as a result of the free choices of network
participants. For instance, the two most popular versions of
Bitcoin are the original Bitcoin network and a forked version
called Bitcoin Cash.27
The most important aspect of open source software is that
it is predicated on voluntary choice. Decisions made on which
versions of software to run are open to anyone, and no legal
barriers exist to participation in a network. Additionally, the
intellectual property regime is much more liberal, and there
are fewer claims which prevent the creation of new
competitive instruments and networks.
A second technical aspect worth discussing is the number
of different ways to categorize the distribution methods of

24 Bitcoin/COPYING, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/
master/COPYING [https://perma.cc/EJD5-R34T].
25 Licensing,
GITHUB,
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/
Licensing [https://perma.cc/N7YW-AYQQ]. But see Matt Savare, John
Wintermute & Shailley Singh, Coders Beware: Licensing Issues Abound for
Ether Apps, COINDESK (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/codersbeware-licensing-issues-abound-ethereum-apps
[https://perma.cc/T2PFXZG4]).
26 Bitcoin/COPYING, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/
master/COPYING [https://perma.cc/EJD5-R34T].
27 A “fork,” when referring to digital assets, is a change in software that
not all parties agree to such that two competing versions of a network are
created. See, e.g., David Farmer, What is a Bitcoin Fork?, COINBASE BLOG
(July
27,
2017),
https://blog.coinbase.com/what-is-a-bitcoin-forkcba07fe73ef1 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
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digital assets.28 This Article adopts the bifurcated typology of
minting and mining discussed by Cohney et al.29 Assets that
are minted are “created through an act of founder fiat.”30 The
creator either uses a blockchain or some other method of
issuance to create assets that are then sold to buyers, either
using smart or more traditional contracts. This is an
alternative to mining, in which those participating in a
network receive digital assets in exchange for their
involvement in the network.31 The important distinction for
below is that with minting, the creator has rights and
privileges with respect to the asset and network that the
purchaser does not have.
Finally, digital assets can be issued through a number of
platforms that keep track of the asset ownership.
Decentralized blockchains are one such method. No single
individual or organization must hold the database that holds
the asset ownership. Instead, the database exists on all of the
nodes in the network running the software. 32 Another, more
traditional method of issuing digital assets involves
centralized databases. Here, a single entity or entities that
have permission maintain the database.

28 E.g., PETER VAN VALKENBURGH, COIN C ENTER, FRAMEWORK FOR
SECURITIES
REGULATION
OF
CRYPTOCURRENCIES, 11–17
(2018),
https://coincenter.org/files/securities-cryptocurrency-framework-v2.1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22FV-GPVZ].
29 See Shaanan Cohsey, David A. Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David A.
Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 29–30).
30 Id. at 30.
31 Id. at 29 n.91.
32 See Daniel Cawrey, What Are Bitcoin Nodes and Why Do We Need
Them?, COINDESK (May 9, 2014), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-nodesneed [https://perma.cc/YHA5-ME4X].
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III. SEC STANCE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
The SEC has articulated its positions on digital assets
through informal guidance,33 enforcement actions,34 and even
a website that explains the perils of the ICO market and
relays up-to-date information.35 Humorously,36 it also hosts a
website promoting its own fake ICO called Howeycoin37 to
demonstrate the problems with parts of the market.38 To date,
there have been no rulemakings, either formal or informal.
The SEC’s most significant policy statements on ICOs
came in a speech delivered by William Hinman, director of the
division of corporation finance and the Framework issued in
April of 2019.39 While other commissioners spoke out about
various issues in digital assets, Hinman was the first speaker
to articulate a cognizable legal standard for classifying the
assets.
The speech sought to answer the following question:
“[Whether] a digital asset that was originally offered in a
securities offering [could] ever be later sold in a manner that
does not constitute an offering of a security[.]”40 First,
Hinman answers that when terms like “coin,” “token,” or

See, e.g., Framework, supra note 16; Press Release, SEC, Statement
on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securitesissuuance-and-trading [https://perma.cc/2EH3-AVJB].
34 See, e.g., supra note 14.
35 See generally Spotlight on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/ICO [https://perma.cc/Q2GB3HE4] (last modified Feb. 7, 2019).
36 This Article uses this term relatively speaking.
37 Howeycoins Pre-ICO Sale, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.howeycoins.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/VN2X-PCWU].
38 Press Release, SEC, The SEC Has an Opportunity You Won’t Want
to Miss: Act Now! (May 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-88 [https://perma.cc/M5NF-VZHW].
39 See Framework, supra note 16; William Hinman, Dir., Div. Corp.
Fin., SEC, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto
(June 14, 2018) [hereinafter Hinman Speech], https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speech-hinman-061418 [https://perma.cc/W7N4-RN8N].
40 Id.
33
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“ICOs” are used in an attempt to evade registration
requirements, the SEC will treat them simply as securities
with a straightforward Howey analysis.41 There are numerous
examples of these types of assets. 42 The second half of the
speech, however, deals with instruments that may not be
securities:
If the network on which the token or coin is to function
is sufficiently decentralized – where purchasers would
no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry
out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts –
the assets may not represent an investment contract.
Moreover, when the efforts of the third party are no
longer a key factor for determining the enterprise’s
success, material information asymmetries recede. As
a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to
identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite
disclosures becomes difficult, and less meaningful. 43

The most notable asset to meet this definition is bitcoin.
Recognizing that such “sufficiently decentralized” digital
assets may not be securities is an important foundational
principle. But this raises a second question: how can the
investment community know what Hinman and the SEC
mean by “sufficiently decentralized”? No operational test has
been offered, which is why this Article proposes the Bahamas
Test.
The Framework focuses on the reasonable expectation of
profits and efforts of others prongs of the Howey inquiry.44
Instead of this Article's more rigid rules-based approach, the
Framework lists a number of characteristics for determining
whether a purchaser had a reasonable expectation of profit
See id.
See, e.g., CarrierEQ, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10575, 2018 WL
6017664 (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/3310575.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM4X-66VV]; Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities
Act Release No. 10574, 2018 WL 6017663 (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10574.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TJ3D-93DL].
43 Hinman Speech, supra note 39.
44 See Framework, supra note 16.
41
42
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derived from the efforts of others.45 In this standards-based
approach, "no one of the . . . characteristics is necessarily
determinative" but the "stronger their presence" the more
likely the instrument is a security.46 The Framework then
goes on to provide a long list of such characteristics. Some
examples of them are:
•

•

•
•
•

An active participant (“AP)47 is responsible for the
development, improvement (or enhancement),
operation, or promotion of the network, particularly if
purchasers of the digital asset expect an AP to be
performing or overseeing tasks that are necessary for
the network or digital asset to achieve or retain its
intended purpose or functionality.
There are essential tasks or responsibilities
performed and expected to be performed by an AP,
rather than an unaffiliated, dispersed community of
network users (commonly known as a "decentralized"
network).
The digital asset gives the holder rights to share in
the enterprise's income or profits or to realize gain
from capital appreciation of the digital asset.
The digital asset is transferable or traded on or
through a secondary market or platform, or is
expected to be in the future.
There is little apparent correlation between the
purchase/offering price of the digital asset and the
market price of the particular goods or services that
can be acquired in exchange for the digital asset. 48

The above is not an exhaustive retelling of the
Framework's list and the Framework's list is not exhaustive

Id.
Id.
47 The Framework defines this as “a promoter, sponsor, or other third
party (or affiliated group of third parties).” Id.
48 Id.
45
46
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of all things considered. But this should give a sense of the
flexible standard reflected in the Framework.
Beyond the speech and the Framework, federal courts have
opined on whether digital assets are securities. One federal
district court, for instance, found no reason why Howey cannot
be applied to digital assets and said that this was a factual
question.49
The three most significant SEC actions thus far are the socalled “DAO Report”, an early cease-and-desist order against
a company called Munchee, and a no-action letter issued
following the release of the Framework to TurnKey Jet, Inc.
(“TKJ”).50 The Decentralized Autonomous Organization
(“DAO”) Report, discussed in greater detail below, declared
the sale of shares in a company run by computer code a
security offering, even though there were no employees or
human issuers of the security other than the code that created
the autonomous corporation.51
The Munchee order, relying on the DAO Report, found that
the company’s selling of digital tokens to help fund a food

49 United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647, 2018 WL 4346339, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018) (“For present purposes, we conclude that
[REcoins] are [investment contracts]. However, the ultimate fact-finder will
be required to conduct an independent Howey analysis based on the
evidence presented at trial.”) (citation omitted).
50 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81207
(Jul. 25, 2017) [hereinafter The DAO Report], https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L5M7-ZXV8];
Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter
Munchee
Order],
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/
33-10445.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4JY-RD2Q]; TurnKey Jet, Inc., SEC NoAction Letter (Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter TurnKey Jet No-Action Letter],
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-0402192a1.htm [https://perma.cc/8SZ4-MWWH]. There have also been a number
of other enforcement actions. See e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges
ICO Superstore and Owners with Operating as Unregistered BrokerDealers (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-185
[https://perma.cc/395P-37KR] (detailing the first action against an
unregistered broker dealer).
51 See The DAO Report, supra note 50; see also infra Part IV.A.1.iii.
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review app was an unregistered security offering.52 This was
in spite of the fact that users would be paid in “MUN token[s]”
for writing food reviews and that there was an ecosystem
promised that would allow individuals to spend their MUN
tokens, potentially even at restaurants. 53 The SEC’s
reasoning focused on (i) the reasonable expectation of profits
by purchasers and (ii) the entrepreneurial and managerial
efforts of Munchee.54 For purposes below, the following
observation is important: “At the time of the offering and sale
of MUN tokens, no other person could make changes to the
Munchee App or was working to create an ‘ecosystem’ to
create demand for MUN tokens.”55
Finally, on the same day the Framework was released, the
SEC issued a no-action letter to TKJ.56 The letter says that
the company’s tokens as presented to the SEC are not
securities and therefore are exempt from registration under
the Securities and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.57 In
making this determination the SEC relied on a number of
factors including:
•

•
•
•

52
53
54
55
56
57

TKJ will not use any funds from Token sales to
develop the TKJ Platform, Network, or App, and each
of these will be fully developed and operational at the
time any Tokens are sold;
The Tokens will be immediately usable for their
intended functionality (purchasing air charter
services) at the time they are sold;
TKJ will restrict transfers of Tokens to TKJ Wallets
only, and not to wallets external to the Platform;
TKJ will sell Tokens at a price of one USD per Token
throughout the life of the Program, and each Token
will represent a TKJ obligation to supply air charter

Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 9–10.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 5–7.
Id. at 9.
TurnKey Jet No-Action Letter, supra note 50.
Id.
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services at a value of one USD per Token;
If TKJ offers to repurchase Tokens, it will only do so
at a discount to the face value of the Tokens (one USD
per Token) that the holder seeks to resell to TKJ,
unless a court within the United States orders TKJ to
liquidate the Tokens; and
The Token is marketed in a manner that emphasizes
the functionality of the Token, and not the potential
for the increase in the market value of the Token.58

As will be shown below, the tests proposed by this Article
would reach the same conclusion in a more straightforward
manner.

IV. HOWEY FOR DIGITAL ASSETS
In applying the Howey test to digital assets, this Article
sets forth a decision tree that will be helpful for determining
whether a particular digital asset is an “investment contract”
under Howey. When an instrument is presented and alleged
to be a security, a court asks if the four Howey factors are met.
This Article deals with two of those factors and proposes an
operational test for helping a court answer whether the
factors have been met. These tests are part of the Howey
decision tree.
This Article assumes that there has been a payment of
value in a collective venture. In most cases of digital asset
purchases, this is the case; thus, the first two prongs of the
test under Howey—an investment of money in a common
enterprise—are presumed satisfied.
The first step of the decision tree is to determine whether
the asset is “sufficiently decentralized”59 such that it does not
satisfy the “efforts of others” prong of the Howey test. This
standard was set forth by SEC Director William Hinman in
the June 2018 speech discussed above. 60

58
59
60

Id.
Hinman Speech, supra note 39.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Thus, if the purchasers never expected a person or group to
carry out such efforts, then the assets are “sufficiently
decentralized” and may not represent an investment contract.
Below we propose what we call the “Bahamas Test” for
determining sufficient decentralization.
Figure 1: A Decision Tree for Digital Assets

The second step of the decision tree applies if the asset is
not sufficiently decentralized. This step determines whether
the investment is made with an expectation of profit. If it is
not made with expectation of profit, then the asset is not a
security. To make this determination, we consider a
“Substantial Steps Test.” This test has its benefits, but
because of the inherent problems in determining an
expectation of profit, we are willing to entertain a full
rethinking of Howey as opposed to the imprecise fit attempted
here.
Generally, the first step asks a more straightforward
question than the second. Expectation of profit will
necessarily involve casuistic determinations of borderline
cases.

A. Efforts of Others Prong – the “Bahamas Test”
The first step toward determining whether a digital asset
is a security is determining whether it is sufficiently
decentralized such that there is no “other” to satisfy the “. . .
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others . . .” prong
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of the Howey test.61 To operationally answer this question,
this Article proposes a “Bahamas Test.” At a high level, the
test holds that if the instrument is a decentralized one that is
not controlled by a single entity, then it is not a security. This
comports with the truism that, for an investment contract to
exist, there must be a contract of some sort, whether implicit
or explicit. If there is no other party to the contract or any
expectation of performance, then there is no contract. The
Bahamas Test asks:
If there is a minting and selling of an instrument, as
opposed to open mining of it, is there either an explicit
or implicit contract to build and manage software such
that if there were a breach of that contract, the project
would fail? If there is no such sale or if there is no such
obligation, then the “efforts of others” prong of the test
is not satisfied and the instrument is not a security.

Said differently: if the sellers fled to the Bahamas or ceased
to show up to work—like Satoshi Nakamoto—would the
project still be capable of existing? 62 If the answer is “yes,”
then the risk of fraud is sufficiently reduced such that the
instrument is not a security.
The Bahamas Test comports with lower courts’
jurisprudence regarding the “efforts of others” prong of the
Howey test. A literal reading of Howey’s stipulation that the
expectation of profit must come “solely through the efforts of
the promoter or of someone other than themselves,” 63 would
suggest that any minor participation by the purchaser could
render the asset not a security. Instead, lower courts have
interpreted the language more broadly. For instance, in a
widely-adopted explication, the Ninth Circuit articulated the
standard as “whether the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential

SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
See infra Section IV.A.1.i (discussing the background of Satoshi
Nakamoto).
63 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added).
61
62
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managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise.”64
If read too literally, this text conflicts with both common
sense and Hinman’s articulation that sufficiently
decentralized assets are not securities. So long as there are
significant efforts made by others, for example, individuals
other than the investor who coded the protocol, then every
non-autarkic network would satisfy the “efforts of others”
prong.65
A more natural reading, however, would be to focus on the
concept of managerial efforts. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman stated that the efforts
must be “entrepreneurial or managerial.”66 “Managerial”
implies a kind of special position, either as a fiduciary or
simply one with additional privileges, responsibilities, and
abilities. In a sufficiently decentralized network, none of those
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts are present because
there are no managers or entrepreneurs.67 There are simply
co-equals exerting effort, but none under a requirement to do

64

SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.

1973).
65 For instance, the open source Bitcoin network has over 600
contributors who have written code for the software. See Bitcoin Core
Integration/Staging Tree, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin
[https://perma.cc/EG58-N8BF]. These contributors are by no means united
in any coherent manner. The vast majority of them have no connection to
Satoshi Nakamoto and probably would not recognize each other while
walking down the street.
66 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
67 Entrepreneur is a term of art. According to economist Ludwig von
Mises, it implies acting in the face of uncertainty to allocate resources in
more productive manners. 1 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE
ON ECONOMICS 290–91 (Bettina Bien Greaves ed., 4th ed. 2007). The
entrepreneur is not the capitalist, but instead has some kind of contractual
arrangement with the capitalist who is risking her capital. In a sufficiently
decentralized network where there are no implied or explicit contracts,
those risking their money do not give it to entrepreneurs or managers with
an expectation of performance.
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so, and with the success of the enterprise not hinging on any
one individual.68
There are two further issues to explain with respect to the
“efforts of others” prong—the difference between minting and
mining and the issue of contractual privity. First, there should
be a fundamental difference between how the securities laws
view minting and mining. When a token is minted, the minter
is in a special position compared with the purchaser. He has
the unilateral ability to change the economic nature of the
asset. This could include changing the supply or some other
characteristic of the asset. On the other hand, when a token
is openly mined, then there is no technical distinction between
promoter and participator as both are on even footing.69 They
are interacting with code that can only be changed through
consensus.70 If the investor is in the exact same position as
the promoter, then the stated information asymmetry
rationale falls away. 71
68 It could be said that decentralization of ownership of the asset is
enough to establish decentralization. This is incorrect because most publicly
traded companies have ownership that is decentralized throughout the
public. Indeed, that is one of the points of public market capital formation.
Instead, in determining decentralization, one should look towards the
centralization of the organizational entity.
69 This is not to say that minted digital assets are categorically “bad”
and mined digital assets are categorically “good.” There can certainly be bad
actors that establish a mined digital asset to make a quick buck and there
can certainly be good actors who mint digital assets, creating a healthy and
vibrant community. What is relevant, however, is the reach of the securities
laws. A diamond miner who sells fake diamonds is not selling securities
simply because he is defrauding purchasers who may be investing money
with an expectation of profit.
70 Viz. consensus is the mechanism for making changes to the
characteristics of the token, not unilateral action. Satoshi could have
unilaterally changed the supply to forty-two million by pushing to the
Github, but people could choose not to run this version of the code. This is
different from a situation where individuals own tokens and more are
minted in a closed-source environment without a choice not to run the code.
Although ERC-20 is not closed source—anyone could create another version
of a token with less supply—but the promoter can say that that token can
no longer interact with her infrastructure.
71 Pre-mining rights at first blush may appear to pose a wrinkle to this
articulation. In such a situation, there is open mining of the asset, but ab
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That is why this Article proposes two distinct conclusions.
First, assets that are mined in an open process where anyone
can participate should be considered prima facie sufficiently
decentralized. In such a case, there is an exchange not of
money, but of computing resources for the digital asset. This
fails the first element of the Howey test—that there must be
an investment of money. 72 Presales, ICOs, and their ilk, on
the other hand, should presumptively fail the “efforts of
others” prong of the test because there is an exchange of
money not for an asset, but for a promise to create an asset or
network that will make such an asset valuable. 73 This has
analogues in extant case law. 74

initio the protocol included already-allocated coins that were reserved by
the promoter for the ownership of pre-mine purchasers. On the one hand, a
privileged group is going to have certain rights that others do not have,
which would abut the open source nature of mining. This would be covered
by the first part of the Bahamas Test, requiring open mining. On the other
hand, if the privileges are openly known then that would qualify as open, or
at least transparent, mining. It is unlikely that the SEC would view this as
anything other than a workaround to the securities laws, and thus the
Bahamas Test would not likely allow the sale of pre-mining rights to fall
outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction.
72 See, e.g., SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No 18-CV-2287, 2019 WL 625163,
at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019) (finding that a company’s offer to exchange
its own tokens for potential investors’ digital currencies satisfied the first
prong of the Howey test).
73 See COINBASE, A SECURITIES LAW FRAMEWORK FOR BLOCKCHAIN
TOKENS
16
(2016),
https://www.coinbase.com/legal/securities-lawframework.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN7C-BN3V] (“This may similarly apply
in the case of a presale made prior to the launch of the system. For example,
one court has found that a purchase agreement that was entered into prior
to the construction of a resort community demonstrated a common
enterprise. This was in part because the construction company was pooling
presale purchase commitments in order to obtain financing to fund the
project, and thus the completion of the project was dependent on generating
sufficient investor interest.”); see also Wooldridge Homes, Inc. v. Bronze
Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Colo. 1983).
74 See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811 (1961); All
Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 68 N.Y.2d 81 (1986); see also VAN
VALKENBURGH, supra note 28, at 49 (“The information asymmetries
inherent in a token pre-sale agreement are by-necessity more pronounced
than a sale of a token powered by a running decentralized network.”).
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The second issue is that of privity and disclaiming liability.
Many ICOs include warranty disclaimers or promises to
actually build the project to completion. However, this kind of
disclaimer cannot be the final word when a court or regulator
determines whether there is an explicit or implicit promise to
build. That is because implicit promises exist even if they are
disclaimed; it is a settled principle of law that disclaimers are
not the final word on whether liability exists. 75 Suppose for
instance that the promoters of a project called Colacoin76
promote that their coins will be used to interact with Colacoin
vending machines. Were the promoters to abscond before
creating any such machines—even though they might attempt
to disclaim any responsibility with respect to actually building
and stocking the vending machines—a court would quickly
look past such disclaimer. Looking past this would not be
based on a subjective expectation of the purchaser of the
security, but rather on the objective actions of the seller in
marketing the coin. The central point of this inquiry into the
seller’s objective actions is whether there was a product or
service implied in marketing the coin that would necessarily
require actions of the promoter to complete.
One key factor in the above analysis is whether there are
technical barriers to entry to participation in the projectnetwork. The SEC weighed the existence of such barriers in
the Munchee order above when they found it relevant that “no
other person could make changes to the Munchee App[.]”77 If
there are no technical barriers, however, and anyone can
make changes to the project-application or network, then
there is much less of a reason to think the instrument is
centralized.
There can be both formal and economic barriers to entry in
any market.78 A formal barrier to entry would be ex ante
75 For example, a defendant manufacturer cannot disclaim product
liability, and a merchant cannot simply disclaim implied warranty of
merchantability.
76 See Cohsey et al., supra note 29, at 10–11.
77 Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 9.
78 See generally JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR
CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956).
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regulation or grants of exclusivity by the government. An
economic barrier to entry, on the other hand, is something like
imposing high upfront capital requirements in an industry
with economies of scale, which makes it costlier for a
newcomer to enter the market. Economic barriers can be
efficient barriers but are not by any means necessarily
pernicious or welfare-decreasing. The formal definition of
barriers, however, is the one that the SEC adopted in
Munchee—it referred to investors’ reliance on the promoters’
stated ability to create an ecosystem that only the company
itself would be able to create.79 Others were not allowed to run
the Munchee software or contribute to the project.
This is not the case with the decentralized Bitcoin network,
where there are no formal barriers to entry, but solely
economic ones. Even though mining bitcoin today is a much
more expensive proposition than it was when it was still
possible to do on central processing units (CPUs), there are
still no formal barriers to mining, nor other formal barriers to
enter the network.80 The promoter is not in any privileged
position relative to investors, except perhaps that she has
earlier knowledge of the project and thus could have mined
without others having heard about it. 81 This contrast between
the accessibility of Munchee and Bitcoin illustrates a central
point: Formal barriers to entry are what authorities should
look at when evaluating sufficient decentralization.
Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 8–9.
Cade Metz, Why A.I. and Cryptocurrency Are Making One Type of
Computer Chip Scarce, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/05/08/technology/gpu-chip-shortage.html [https://perma.cc/VY
R9-YQPT].
81 If the promoter tries to hide her intentions and mine such that it
becomes functionally the same as minting, this case seems like a concert
promoter who does not tell anyone who the concert is so that she can buy
the tickets ahead of time. However, if the network is open, then the future
participants would have knowledge of the activity before their buy-in. To
analogize to the concert promoter—there would be a ledger showing that
tickets were already owned by the promoter herself. The decision to then
participate is on the purchaser and the fact that an individual owns a high
proportion of the outstanding issue is something that the participant can
weigh.
79
80
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A counterargument is that economic barriers to entry can
be as powerful as formal ones, and should also factor into the
decentralization analysis. This suggests a more expansive
definition of monopoly and centralization than the formal
barriers definition. Such arguments are premised on a weak
conception of voluntariness—the thought being that an
individual no more “chooses” to use a popular social network
like Facebook than she chooses to eat every day. Similarly, the
critic would say that participation in the most popular
cryptocurrency network at the time, like Bitcoin, is not
voluntary because economic and social pressures have made
it the dominant, unavoidable, player.
The response first is that the history of American
business—and especially the history of the software industry
with its low barriers to entry—has shown that so long as free
entry is possible, there is rarely an entity that maintains its
dominance for long, particularly if it is harming the market or
behaving badly more generally.82 In other words, robust
market forces provide a powerful check on supposed
centralized monopolies. If, for instance, Satoshi Nakamoto
were to have suggested new code early on that would have
increased his share of bitcoins, it is hard to imagine the
community approving. There are examples where miners and
others have resisted forks even though influential groups
supported them.83 This behavior is akin to the market’s
reaction to an industry leader’s misstep. Economic barriers to
entry can be efficient if they are the result of natural benefits
of bigness, such as economies of scale or network effects. These

See, e.g., Jeffrey Dorfman, What Antitrust Should Look Like in a
World
of
Low
Entry
Barriers,
FORBES
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2016/10/24/what-shouldantitrust-look-like-in-a-world-of-low-entry-barriers/#195a5da11b46
[https://perma.cc/7HMZ-KASL].
83 See Nathaniel Popper, Some Bitcoin Backers Are Defecting to Create
a Rival Currency, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/25/business/dealbook/bitcoin-cash-split.html
[https://perma.
cc/793Q-U35M].
82
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effects are not enough to overcome either corporate sins of
commission84 or omission.85
A second response to this critique of the definition of
centralization is that viewing consent in terms of legal and
technical terms is a clearer line that better comports with
society’s general notions of consent. Individuals may think
using Facebook is not a free choice because they are forced
into doing it as a result of the network effects (i.e. “all my
friends are using it”), but legally speaking, this is at worst
damnum absque injuria—a loss without a legally cognizable
injury. Too broad a definition of involuntary action could lead
to a legal regime where every contract and agreement is open
to rescission, injecting uncertainty and chaos into society.
One potential objection to this test is that the binary
nature of this Bahamas inquiry is inferior to evaluating a
promoter shirking his managerial activity on a sliding scale.
For instance, a sliding scale would treat differently a promoter
who flees when there is a ninety percent chance of the project’s
success than one who flees when there is a ten percent chance
of success. In the latter, the intuition would be that the
promoter does not “deserve” a big chunk of the investment if
he dramatically reduces the probability of the project’s
success.
The trouble with this argument is that it fails to appreciate
the fundamental difference between open source projects and
traditional companies. The nature of open source software
projects is that there is no inherent ownership over the
codebase, and it is one of the norms of the open source
software community that there is a decentralized ownership

84 Joe Nocera, Opinion, The Inside History of the ‘New Coke’ Debacle,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2017-11-03/the-inside-history-of-the-new-coke-debacle (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
85 JLuo, The Rise and Fall (and Rise Again?) of BlackBerry, HARV. BUS.
SCH. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://digit.hbs.org/submission/the-rise-and-fall-andrise-again-of-blackberry/ [https://perma.cc/D3E6-ZWJX].
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structure.86 In a traditional company, there are both duties of
care and loyalty that are legally cognizable; no similar norms
or duties are legally, or even morally, assumed in the very
libertarian ethos of open source projects. 87 The Bahamas Test
is therefore well-tailored to the realities of open source digital
assets because it incorporates a workable definition of consent
and emphasizes only technical barriers to entry.

1. Applying the Bahamas Test
This Section considers the decentralized status of three
networks under the Bahamas Test: Bitcoin,88 Ethereum,89

86 Certain aspects of an open source project may be closed source. If it
is possible to sever those aspects from the project itself, then they should be
analyzed under a different rubric than the open source parts.
87 But see Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust: Software Developers as
Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains, in THE BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: LEGAL
& POLICY CHALLENGES (Georgios Dimitropoulos et al. eds.) (forthcoming
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3203198
[https://perma.cc/84UF-Z9FL]. Walch argues that a fiduciary duty can exist
in open source projects. Id. at 3. One of the criteria she uses to determine if
there is a fiduciary duty is whether there is an entrustment of either
property or power. See id. at 10. She claims that a duty exists in certain
open source projects because certain core developers can have significant
power and control over the property of the network. Id. at 3. The trouble
with this argument is that mere exercise of power does not create a
fiduciary. It is the entrustment of that power. For example, individuals who
agreed to participate in an open source project or the network it forms did
not have any powers they entrusted to the network. They chose to
participate, which gave the developers power by virtue of their
participation. This is no different from attending a speech—the speaker has
not been granted a fiduciary duty simply because he is more powerful
because he has a platform. In other words, the power is created by the
network participant—neither it nor property is entrusted to the developers.
88 For a general background of Bitcoin, see Max I Raskin, Realm of the
Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L., 969, 971–
72 (2015).
89 For a general background of Ethereum, see Bernard Marr,
Blockchain: A Very Short History of Ethereum Everyone Should Read,
FORBES (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2018/02/02/blockchain-a-very-short-history-of-ethereum-everyone-shouldread/#549791d01e89 [https://perma.cc/3DUN-Z2DA].
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and The DAO.90 This is to show that the test works not only
prospectively but retrospectively—it ensures that the test is
not simply our normative view of what the law should be, but
what the law is.

i. Bitcoin
The Bitcoin project was originally created by a person or
group called Satoshi Nakamoto. Nakamoto wrote a white
paper in which he91 presented the idea of the Bitcoin network
and then worked with a group of new individuals to release
the first version of the software. 92 The Bitcoin White Paper
(the “White Paper”) made no investment claims, nor did
Nakamoto make any promises regarding seeing the project to
fruition.93 This closely adheres to how open source
communities work. In fact, only a few years after launching
the Bitcoin network, Nakamoto disappeared and no longer
wrote code for the project or contributed in any meaningful
way. He still retained the huge amount of bitcoin that he
initially mined, having an estimated 980,000 bitcoin.94 Yet the

90 For a general background of The DAO, see Nathaniel Popper, A
Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World of Virtual
Currency, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/
business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-50-million-fromexperimental-cybercurrency-project.html [https://perma.cc/J2J6-V3HK]. A
corollary to the Bahamas Test is a Capitalization Test—if the first letter of
the network is capitalized, then it is not sufficiently decentralized.
91 Some will object to using “he” as the personal pronoun for Nakamoto
when it is not known if Nakamoto is a male, let alone an individual. This
article uses “he” for brevity’s sake, fully aware that this footnote defeats this
purpose.
92 See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/N55DLTXA].
93 Even if the White Paper did make investment claims, it is unlikely
that bitcoin would be classified as a security any more than baseball cards
are classified as a security even though they can be sold by dealers
promising an increase in value. This is precisely because there is no
satisfaction of the “others” prong of Howey.
94 See Evelyn Cheng, There Are Now 17 Million Bitcoins in Existence –
Only 4 Million Left to ‘Mine,’ CNBC (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
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SEC, as heard through Hinman, believes bitcoin is not a
security.95 This determination did not hinge on the effort
Nakamoto contributed. Had Nakamoto left the project a
month or even a year earlier, he could do so because he was
under no obligation; he made no promises—implicit or
explicit—to those involved with the project. The real analysis
was whether he was an “other” at all. 96 He clearly was not.
The law ought to encourage innovators in the open source field
to create decentralized projects and not calculate the exact
time they can jump ship—at least in these kinds of projects, it
is better that the ship has no captain.
This is an easy case. As Director Hinman said in his
speech, “when I look at Bitcoin today, I do not see a central
third party whose efforts are a key determining factor in the
enterprise.”97 Thus, bitcoin appears sufficiently decentralized
to pass the Bahamas Test and should not be regulated as a
security under Howey.

ii. Ethereum
The Ethereum Network is a more difficult case. Vitalik
Buterin conceived and promoted the network, and Buterin
held a presale and made promises to build software. 98 In
Buterin’s words, “You are trusting us to take the bitcoin and

2018/04/26/there-are-now-17-million-bitcoins-in-existence--only-4-millionleft-to-mine.html [https://perma.cc/XN49-CW72]. Given the considerable
volatility in bitcoin price, we leave it to the reader to calculate the current
value in U.S. dollars. See Bitcoin Price (BTC), COINDESK, https://www.coin
desk.com/price/bitcoin (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
95 See generally Hinman Speech, supra note 39.
96 There is also an issue of whether there was a sale directly from
Nakamoto—this, however, is a proxy for determining whether there was
any promise made. The existence of consideration is a good indication that
there was something exchanged on the other side. In the case of a presale,
as opposed to mining, this promise is often to build or maintain a network.
97 Hinman Speech, supra note 39.
98 Victoria van Eyk, Ethereum Launches Own ‘Ether’ Coin, with
Millions
Already
Sold,
COINDESK
(July
23,
2014),
https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-launches-ether-coin-millions-alreadysold [https://perma.cc/H7J4-T7FM].
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use it to develop Ethereum.”99 If, following the presale,
Buterin and his team had absconded to the Bahamas, his
proposed project almost certainly would have collapsed. Thus,
Ether would fail the Bahamas Test. This alone, however, does
not mean that Ether is a security. There is still the second step
of the test.100
Furthermore, as Director Hinman pointed out, an asset
that was once issued as a security—and even an unregistered
security—can later lose its security characteristics.101 Peter
Van Valkenburgh gives a particularly useful analogy:
[T]ake the facts of the Howey case itself, and make a
small change. As before, Mr. Howey convinces people
to give him money for land in Florida; he says they
own the land and he says he’ll maintain the orange
trees that grow on the land. But, instead of promising
to pay investors profits from selling the oranges at
market, he promises to give them the oranges. This
fact does not change the outcome in Howey—the [sic]
court would still have found that investment contracts
for an orange grove in Florida had been sold—but, of
course, the oranges themselves would never have been
found to be securities. If one of the resultant oranges
ends up in a grocery store, you don’t need a broker
dealer to buy it for you. People know this intuitively
with oranges and other scarce physical things (of
course this inert object I hold in my hand isn’t a
security—it’s just a thing), but many haven’t yet
internalized that scarce digital things now exist and
the same reasoning applies.102

On the other end of the spectrum is an ICO like REcoin, for
which the issuers made specific promises about backing
tokens with real estate.103 This is a contractual statement,
Id.
See infra Section IV.B (discussing the “expectation of profit”
analysis of Ethereum, which concludes Ether could pass the Substantial
Steps Test).
101 Hinman Speech, supra note 39.
102 VAN VALKENBURGH, supra note 28, at 61.
103 Cali Haan, RECoin and Diamond Reserve Coin ICO Issuer Pleads
Guilty
to
Fraud,
CROWDFUND
INSIDER
(Nov.
16,
2018),
99

100
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and were the promoters to flee, the project would cease to exist
because it would not fulfill its primary claim of economic
value. REcoin would thus fail the Bahamas Test because it is
not decentralized. This easy case provides a meaningful
contrast to Ether’s more ambiguous status.

iii. The DAO
An even more difficult case than Ether is The DAO. The
DAO was meant to operate as an investment fund, in which
investors would fund an entity that would later make
distributions to fund business ventures. 104 The DAO would
not be like other venture capital funds in a key way—there
would be no general partner making decisions on behalf of the
limited partners. Instead, using an open-source code,
members of the Ethereum community would use a coding
framework—Slock.it—to build a smart contract on the
Ethereum blockchain. The smart contract would be selfexecuting, meaning once it was built and deployed, the smart
contract would make investment-funding decisions. Anyone
with a project could pitch an idea to The DAO community—
which raised 12.7 million Ether (valued at about $150 million
at that time). Individuals with tokens could vote on the plan,
and if the projects were profitable, they would receive
distributions.
Things fell apart.105 A hacker found a weakness in the
code, which allowed him to steal nearly $55 million, about a

https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/11/141403-recoin-and-diamondreserve-coin-ico-issuer-pleads-guilty-to-fraud/
[https://perma.cc/362GSEB9].
104 Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to
Automate Governance Final Draft – Under Review (unpublished
manuscript),
https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YNS3-Q23G].
105 See Osman Gazi Güçlütürk, The DAO Hack Explained: Unfortunate
Take-off
of
Smart
Contracts,
MEDIUM
(Aug.
1,
2018),
https://medium.com/@ogucluturk/the-dao-hack-explained-unfortunatetake-off-of-smart-contracts-2bd8c8db3562 [https://perma.cc/A8WV-D9DD].
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third of the fund.106 The hacker was not the person who set up
The DAO, since no single individual set up The DAO. Instead,
the hacker simply observed the weakness—which had to do
with the timing of how the smart contracts and token balances
were updated—and exploited it.
At first blush, it would seem The DAO was sufficiently
decentralized. The founders of the project could have left the
project, and it would not fail because others could and did
participate in the network.107 Furthermore, Slock.it had
denied implicit or explicit obligations to those participating in
the project. Thus, under the Bahamas Test, The DAO would
appear to not satisfy the definition of an investment contract,
and could not be regulated as a security.
The SEC, however, disagreed.108 It declared The DAO was,
in fact, offering unregistered securities.109 The SEC focused
on the “Curators”—a group of individuals chosen by Slock.it
to manage aspects of The DAO. 110 Though the SEC decided
not to pursue any enforcement action,111 the pronouncement
still stands. The answer to reconcile this outcome with the
Bahamas Test, however, is that our initial intuition from the
Bahamas Test was wrong and that The DAO was not
sufficiently decentralized.
There are two reasons for this. The first is the simple
explanation that the Curators had specific responsibilities
and obligations to the DAO project. Most importantly, they
whitelisted Ethereum addresses that could receive Ether from

106 See Matthew Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/ (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
107 See Michael del Castillo, The DAO: Or How a Leaderless Ethereum
Project Raised $50 Million, COINDESK (May 12, 2016), https://www.coin
desk.com/the-dao-just-raised-50-million-but-what-is-it
[https://perma.
cc/26DG-DRCN].
108 See The DAO Report, supra note 50.
109 Id. at 11–16.
110 Id. at 7.
111 Id. at 1.
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The DAO. This certainly fails the Bahamas Test, and
therefore, The DAO was not sufficiently decentralized. 112
Had there been no Curators, the case would be closer, so it
is worth discussing the second reason the initial intuition is
wrong: a conflation of decentralized networks and
decentralized corporations. Decentralized networks generally
do not make promises to their participants other than to abide
by certain protocols.113 They do not use computer code to place
obligations on third parties to manage the effort. A
decentralized corporation, on the other hand, can still make
promises to investors—and in the case of The DAO, did make
promises to investors. The promises were not about
performance, but about distributions. The DAO codified these
promises, albeit in smart contracts. The DAO entity itself was
the offeror of the security and the SEC’s reasoning was that
those behind The DAO were the coders and the Curators.
Contrast this with Bitcoin, where there was no promise made
to a certain share of profits or any obligation on any third
party.
An
additional
reason
for
finding
insufficient
decentralization is that the Curators of The DAO had special
rights and powers that average users did not have.114 This
was baked into the code and created obligations. For instance,
they had the power to change the governance of the DAO such
that they could lower the threshold for voting on proposals.115
This is a special power that can be characterized as a privilege
or contractual arrangement. This whitelisting of proposals
fails the Bahamas Test because if the users were to walk
away, they would be in breach.

112 For purposes of argument, this Article accepts the Howey
framework of the expectation of profit and assumes that this was present in
this case.
113 Were a decentralized network to encode certain promises to
investors that put obligations on others, this would change the analysis.
Admittedly, the line between promises to investors and encoded protocols is
blurry.
114 See id. at 7–8.
115 Id. at 8.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265295

476

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

The SEC’s reasoning, however, muddies the waters by
focusing on users’ reliance on Slock.it, instead of their reliance
on The DAO. The SEC in its opinion stated, “The DAO’s
investors relied on the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts
of Slock.it and its co-founders, and The DAO’s Curators, to
manage The DAO and put forth project proposals that could
generate profits for The DAO’s investors.”116 The SEC then
goes on to list a number of technical ways in which investors
relied on Slock.it.117 This is unnecessary because the smart
contracts that encoded the DAO made certain promises. That
itself is enough to fail the Bahamas Test because if the
decentralized DAO was to abscond, the project would
necessarily fail.
Imagine, for a moment, that Apple’s board of directors and
managers were replaced by computer code. This computer
could either execute the wishes of decentralized shareholders
or be artificially intelligent and autonomous, but otherwise
behaved and invested like any other board. Now suppose the
computer code was “hacked” 118 and money was transferred
from Apple’s coffers to the hacker. Whether this “hack” is
fraud or a clever use of code does not change the fact that the
decentralized shareholders still hold, albeit now less valuable,
securities. This is because there were promises, either implicit
or explicit, that the offeror (Apple) was going to do something
for the purchaser. Whether it was a computer or group of
humans who were doing the promising, there was still a
promise. In this case, the promises were not explicit, but
rather implicit because the purchaser of DAO tokens had an
expectation. That being said, there is an intractable problem
of who is making the promises, and by extension, who is
selling those securities.
Slock.it was promoting here—it is not that they were
involved with the DAO. The question for the SEC was whether
they were involved in the promotion of selling the securities,
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
118 This is a loaded term in The DAO context because the “hack”
involved someone taking advantage of a loophole but not stealing any
information—such as a password—to gain unauthorized access.
116
117
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made the promises to the purchasers, and were expected by
the purchasers to promote and manage the venture. An
individual who owns no equity in a company can still be liable
for selling securities—the Howey test looks at the instrument
itself.119 That the SEC did not bring any kind of case against
Slock.it is telling. This was clearly more of an example of
experimentation than investment defrauding. The “bad actor”
here was not anyone related to The DAO, but rather a
hacker.120 The SEC’s non-enforcement was the right
outcome—The DAO hack is not a situation that the Securities
Act was meant to cover.

iv. Summary of the Bahamas Test
The virtue of the Bahamas Test is that it gets at what the
securities laws aim to prevent: individuals being taken
advantage of based on information asymmetry.121 It does this
in a manner that it easy to operationalize because it is not
difficult to distinguish open from closed networks or instances
where promises have been made from those where promises
have not. This is a fairly simple determination and one that
courts make regularly.

B. Expectation of Profit Prong
The second node of the decision tree shown in Figure 1, and
thus the second step in our analysis, is whether the
instrument is primarily about investment or about
consumption—this is the “expectation of profit” prong from
Howey. If an instrument fails the Bahamas Test, i.e., it is not
sufficiently decentralized, and passes the expectation of profit

119 See, e.g., SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d
Cir. 1941) (holding intermediary in bond sales that was not even earning a
commission sold unregistered securities in violation of securities laws by
arranging sale).
120 There is an open question of whether the hacker even was a bad
actor.
121 Whether one accepts that the state needs to play this role is beyond
the scope of this Article.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265295

478

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

prong—as evaluated under the two standards described
below—it should be regulated as a security.
This prong is, frankly, a more difficult one to analyze than
the first discussed. The structure of this Section hopefully
reflects this difficulty by posing more theoretical concerns.
This Section begins with a recap of the current test for
expectation of profits, and includes a discussion on the
amount of resale in the secondary market. Then, it proposes
the “Substantial Steps Test.”

1. Current Test—Facts and Circumstances
With respect to the “expectation of profit” prong of the
Howey test in the digital asset context, there is a temptation
to use a multi-factor test or employ a “I know it when I see it”
analysis.122 The SEC relied on this in Munchee.123 Among
other things, the trouble with multi-factor analyses is that
they create legal uncertainty—their virtue is flexibility to the
regulator. That is why this multi-factor analysis—“facts and
circumstances”—is largely the approach chosen by the SEC in
its enforcement actions and articulated in its Framework.124
One of the factors that could be relevant for determining
whether there is an expectation of profit is the ratio of
individual buyers who consume the instrument versus resell
the instrument—that is, the velocity of the secondary market.
Certainly, in the vast and overwhelming number of ICOs, the
purchasers are profit-seeking because in many instances
there is no useable product, nor will there ever be a useable
product.125 This latter result could be because of fraud or
122 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
123 “Determining whether a transaction involves a security does not
turn on labeling – such as characterizing an ICO as involving a ‘utility
token’ – but instead requires an assessment of ‘the economic realities
underlying a transaction.’” Munchee Order, supra note 50, at 9.
124 See Framework, supra note 16 (“Whether a particular digital asset
at the time of its offer or sale satisfies the Howey test depends on the specific
facts and circumstances.”).
125 See Cohsey et al., supra note 29 (noting a number of important
features of smart contract ICOs—including scarcity, lock-in, and
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because the business simply failed. But this factor is not
dispositive because there are certainly instances where a low
ratio of consumers-to-sellers does not deem an instrument an
“investment contract.” For instance, a concert promoter may
sell 50,000 Lady Gaga concert tickets to various dealers
knowing that these dealers (and many of their customers) may
turn around and resell them for a profit depending on how the
supply and demand change over time. No one believes, and
the SEC has never taken the position, that the intent of the
initial buyers in such a case would turn a concert ticket into a
security. This is in large part because it is the market as a
whole that determines the price, not the effort of the
individual promoters. Courts have consistently held that
markets where supply and demand, and not the managerial
efforts of others, determines the market price are not
securities markets.126
One could complicate the concert ticket case by imagining
the concert promoter does not yet have Lady Gaga signed up
yet but rather offers the following deal: the promoter will sell
50,000 tickets for a venue and an act to be determined, based
in part on how much money the promoter is able to raise
through the sale. This is a more difficult case for reasons that
have little to do with the expected velocity of the secondary
market. Instead, the concern is that the promoter might
abscond with the money or, perhaps, not exert the effort or
expend the resources that the buyers expect. The latter
concern—low promoter effort—seems to prove too much, since
this is present in every exchange of money for value, whether
it is going to the movies or eating out or buying any product.
modifiability). These features are often not encoded in the actual software,
leading them to conclude that there is something inherently fraudulent in
the ICO market. See id. The trouble with this analysis is that it implies that
sticking to the smart contract is what the purchasers value, where it may
be the case that the low cost of non-SEC issuance is the real value in these
markets.
126 See, e.g., SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., Inc., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.
1986) (dealing with a sale of gold coins); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d
77 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving a forward contract for silver); Sinva, Inc. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (addressing a futures contract for sugar).
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It might be worth less than expected. In general, one expects
markets and general anti-fraud rules, enforced by both
private actions and the government, to take the edge off this
concern. The
former
concern—fully
absconding—is
significant, and this Article addresses it below. But it is
doubtful that if a concert promoter offered this contract the
SEC would intervene.
The case of tokens can be similarly difficult. A token that
is redeemable for a product or service might not be considered
a security, but what if an entity bought most or all of the
tokens with the goal of reselling them to consumers? This
might look like a distribution, with the initial seller engaged
in a scheme to avoid the securities laws. But, if the initial
buyer were purchasing bananas to resell, the initial seller of
bananas would not be engaged in a securities transaction.
Other problems arise. When considering resales, how
should one weigh the tokens—by number of tokens or
individual person? Tokens are also mixed-use—unlike concert
seats, they can be used for multiple things. How does one
compare the utility of one individual who is consuming the
token with the utility of another purely speculating?127 Ether
used to power smart contracts may have tremendous value to
a small number of individuals actually running smart
contracts and building their applications on them—but the
vast majority of Ether owners are likely owning for profitseeking reasons. The fundamental problem is that an
investment contract for one individual may not be an
investment contract for another, but as the SEC cannot make
these individual determinations, it must necessarily draw a
line, which creates imprecision.
Other tests could be used. One might look at the intent of
the buyer. If the buyer intends to resell, or perhaps enough
buyers intend to resell, then the expectation of profit prong
127 This challenge for utilitarian theory formed the basis of Robert
Nozick’s “Utility Monster” thought experiment. See generally ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). This theory is accepted in
contemporary analyses. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency,
and the Promise of Decisional Equity: From Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 935 (2009).
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might be satisfied. This raises significant line-drawing
problems, as noted above. How many buyers motivated by
resale would be enough to turn something into a security? But,
more problematically, it would create significant uncertainty
for issuers, who would have to guess as to the motivation of
buyers, which they cannot control. This would effectively kill
any exemption along these lines.
It is for perhaps this reason that the SEC and courts have
eschewed the motive of buyers, focusing instead on the intent
of the issuer regarding what the issuer is offering, as reflected
through the marketing of the offering. This approach is
illustrated by the SEC’s consideration of these issues in the
context of condominiums. After all, a real estate developer
might build a condo building and sell the initial condos to
individuals who intend only to resell them. One can easily see
how the situation could look much like the concert promoter
examples above. Another option would be for the developer to
sell interests in condos to individuals who would continue to
own them but had no intention to live in them, preferring to
rent them out. A few tweaks could make this into an
investment scheme that looked just like the facts of Howey.
Individuals might invest money in a condo development
motivated entirely or primarily by the money that the
investment would generate, instead of a desire to live in the
condo.
The SEC addressed this problem through the issuance of
an informal lawmaking known as a “release.” Release 5347,
issued on January 4, 1973, set forth the conditions under
which an investment condo would be considered a security.128
The goal was to reduce the uncertainty for real estate
developers and buyers and sellers of condos. The release
provided:
. . . condominiums, coupled with a rental
arrangement, will be deemed to be securities if they
128 Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to
Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development,
Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973) [hereinafter “SEC Release
No.
5347”],
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/1973/33-5347.pdf
[perma.cc/U9M4-ZNA9].
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are offered and sold through advertising, sales
literature,
promotional
schemes
or
oral
representations which emphasize the economic
benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter . . . in renting the
units.129

This test is designed to draw a jurisdictional line, putting
the scarce resources of the SEC to work in cases in which there
is a greater risk of fraud or irrational behavior that might
implicate the capital markets. By focusing on marketing
materials, the test may risk being both under-inclusive and
over-inclusive, but it in turn gives some certainty to buyers
and sellers. And, at least in the condo case, it avoids the more
complicated inquiries into buyers’ intents, the nature of the
resale markets, and so on.
One could imagine deploying a similar test for digital
assets—if they are sold through materials emphasizing “the
economic benefits to the purchaser” from reselling them, then
they would be securities, while if they are pitched as
opportunities for consumption of goods or services, they would
not be. Although potentially useful, there is a problem with
this approach. In a context in which the public has an
expectation about ICOs that is already formulated—perhaps,
that they are a way to get rich quick—then the marketing
materials may not matter very much. Of course, such a
concern might also have been true during the condo craze
during the recent run up in housing prices before the financial
crisis, but it was not enough to move the SEC to regulate
condos.
Compounding the problems of the expectations of profit
test is the approach of the SEC. The SEC’s analysis thus far
has not been static, which has reduced the certainty of any
regulatory action. As the SEC has recently pointed out, Ether
may have begun as a security—because there was an
expectation of profit stemming from a centralized promoter—
but is now no longer a security.130 Even the advertisements

129
130

Id. at 3.
See Hinman Speech, supra note 39.
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and presale by the Ethereum Foundation were not enough to
counteract what the Ethereum network had become.
Thus, any new test must incorporate the facts that: (a) an
instrument that did carry with it an expectation of profit can
morph into one that does not; and (b) expectation of profit with
respect to utility is a nebulous concept, especially when
involving multiple buyers and sellers131 of an instrument.

2. Proposal—Substantial Steps Test
This Article proposes a Substantial Steps Test for
determining whether a token is purchased with an
expectation of profit. The focus of this test is not on how the
object of the token or coin is marketed, but on whether
someone is actually producing it. The purpose of this shift in
the inquiry is to reflect concerns over the fact that the
marketing test may be under-inclusive on fraud protection in
the current chaotic environment for digital assets. The
possibility that the test could evolve as conditions change
remains open.
The Substantial Steps Test is as follows:
Are the promoters taking good faith, substantial steps
towards completion of a project that they believe will
have use to some users of the token beyond resale
value or economic income? If so, then the instrument
is not sold with an expectation of profit and thus is not
classified as an investment contract.

So long as the issuer of a token is in fact engaged in a good
faith effort to build the underlying product or service for which
the token will be redeemable, then the token is not an
investment, but rather purchased for consumption. This is
true even if there is a robust secondary market for tokens.
After all, there is a robust secondary market for condos,
homes, cars, boats, and practically all other real and personal
property.

131 Some of the sellers may have an intent to build a network, while
others may be snake oil salesmen.
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Return to the concert promoter hypothetical discussed
above.132 The Substantial Steps Test applied to the case of the
Lady Gaga concert yields an easy answer—it is not a security
because obtaining a venue and a performer would clearly
constitute substantial steps. This result is in accord with how
the SEC views the case, since concert promoters do not even
feel the need to request a no-action letter. After all, concert
tickets are not marketed as an investment opportunity, as
dictated by Release 5347. 133
But what about the tougher case of the concert promoter
without a venue or a performer who pitches the offer as a way
of raising money to afford a top venue and performer in the
first place? Under the marketing test, one would simply look
to how the promoter packaged the opportunity—if it were sold
as a way of getting in early so as to profit from the efforts of
the promoter, then it would be a security; if it were instead
sold as a concert lottery ticket of sorts (instead of an economic
one), then it would not. But, as noted above in the exploration
of the facts and circumstances test, for digital assets, this
might not paint a full picture. Instead, the Substantial Steps
Test asks whether the promoter is in fact taking concrete
steps to put on a concert, or is merely trying to create a frenzy
in which the whole game is the secondary market.
The virtue of this test to a federal regulator is that it
encourages the development of useful projects and it
discourages the sale of unregulated securities that are solely
designed to enrich the promoter and its affiliates through
creating a secondary market. It essentially says that when a
seller of an instrument uses those proceeds to build a product
in some way connected to the instrument, then the seller does
not have to register the sale.
Importantly, the test has a requirement of
continuousness—as soon as the promoters cease trying to
create an actual, functional software project, the consumers
can no longer have a reasonable expectation of some

132
133

See supra Section IV.B.1.
See SEC Release No. 5347, supra note 128.
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consumptive utility and any sales are likely done with an
expectation of profit.
The challenge of this test, beyond determining the
subjective intent of the promoters, is that it creates the
possibility of a non-security becoming a security. This poses
two problems: monitoring and creating proper incentives.
After discussing both these problems, this Article lays out a
solution for regulators to adopt.
On the monitoring side, the regulator must ensure that the
promoter is compliant by continuing to take those substantial
steps towards the creation of a useful project.134 One can
imagine lots of ways in which ongoing compliance with these
regulatory expectations could be measured. Regulators could
require periodic updates, involving affidavits from promoters
filed on a periodic basis, for example. This could be done
whether the regulator is the government or, in a likely better
approach, a self-regulatory body that acts as a first-line
regulator, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA). Such affidavits, under penalty of felony,
could provide a basis for ex post enforcement, including a loss
of membership fees and bans in the case of a self-regulatory
organization (SRO) or civil and criminal sanctions in the case
of the government regulator.
On the incentives side, entrepreneurs are in a difficult
position. Put simply, fraud is not the only reason projects fail.
For example, an entrepreneur acting in good faith may have
raised money through a coin offering to build a service she
cannot complete. At some point, she will need to stop taking
substantial steps to establish the business as a useful creation
as it winds down. This potential ex post security label would
disincentivize entrepreneurs from the outset. The flip side of
this disincentive, however, is deterring the bad faith
entrepreneur who initially takes substantial steps toward her

134 It may not be the SEC itself that has jurisdiction to engage in this
monitoring, but rather the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or
some other entity.
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business’s development and subsequently spends the rest of
the business funds on Lamborghinis and alpaca socks.135
A registration system discussed below, whether it is with
the government or an SRO would help address this problem.
Affidavits regarding substantial steps could be withdrawn
based on changes in business facts. When that happens, the
tokens would become unregistered securities, and therefore
could not be resold without registration. Those who initially
sold instruments that later became unregistered securities
would not be liable under securities laws unless they sold the
instruments after they were deemed unregistered securities.
This solution, however, presents some problems under
current law because a security cannot currently arise from a
non-security in this fashion. Accordingly, if something is
deemed to be a security, and it were sold or resold without
registration or an exemption therefrom, it would subject the
seller of the security to liability. Under the Substantial Steps
Test, this would turn business risk into legal risk—any good
faith effort to create a product or service that failed would
subject the promoter to legal liability for selling unregistered
securities. The market would therefore need a safe harbor for
token issuers who would otherwise be subjected to liability
through this quirk of adding the test to current law.
To solve the above problems and operationalize the
Substantial Steps Test, this Article endorses a safe harbor
similar to one previously offered.136 The proposal is as follows:
A developer, seller, or token exchange shall be free
from civil and criminal liability for violations of
securities laws if they:

135 It is worth mentioning that a perfect subjective test would take care
of this second challenge by allowing reviewers to read the mind of the
entrepreneurs to separate the good from the bad actors. But this side of
Eden, there are only proxies for intent.
136 See VAN VALKENBURGH, supra note 28; see also Peter van
Valkenburgh, Principles for Clarifying SEC Jurisdiction over
Cryptocurrencies and ICOs, COIN CENTER (May 24, 2018),
https://coincenter.org/entry/principles-for-clarifying-sec-jurisdiction-overcryptocurrencies-and-icos [https://perma.cc/U8L7-EQNK].
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1. Register as a developer, seller, or token exchange
with the SEC or approved self-regulatory
organization, providing [name, contact information,
and a brief description of the token related activities
in which they intend to engage or have previously
engaged], and
2. Have a reasonable and good faith belief that the
tokens they are developing, selling, or exchanging are
not either:
a. Tokens that represent a promise by a developer
or seller to deliver a future open blockchain token
if the developer or seller accepted money from
purchasers and advertised that said future token
will be a valuable investment; or
b. Tokens that represent specific contracted-for
rights to profits derived from the efforts of the
developer or seller beyond mere appreciation of the
token’s value if the developer or seller has accepted
money from purchasers; and
3. Take reasonably prompt and effective action to
cease development, sale, or exchange of a token that is
identified as a security by the SEC or otherwise ceases
to meet the criteria described in (2)(a)–(b) above.137

This lighter registration requirement goes beyond the antifraud rationale by helping to bridge the information
asymmetry between the seller and purchaser. The prospective
purchaser would see a clear statement about the asset, given
the ease of articulating the value of a product in a short simple
statement. For instance, a token could allow an individual to
watch television over the Internet or could be used to backup
files. Such statements could also provide a basis for future
civil or criminal actions against the seller. One possible
concern, however, is that such a light registration
requirement would quickly come to resemble the current
regulatory regime in which there is a risk of too much
regulatory discretion. Having a link to a tangible product
mitigates this risk.
On the front end, the Substantial Steps Test encourages
entrepreneurs to take substantial steps towards building a
137

Id.
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useful product. On the back end, the safe harbor discourages
them from stopping because what was once not a security can
ex post attain the status of a security.138 This is the mirror
image of Ethereum, which was once possibly a security, but
now is no longer.
As a coda to this Section, the SEC’s no-action letter issued
to TKJ confirms the validity of the Substantial Steps Test.
Clearly the tokens issued by TKJ would fail the Bahamas Test
as there were rights, privileges, and obligations the promoters
had that would doom the project were they to abscond to the
Bahamas. On the Substantial Steps Test, it is clear that the
promoters here are taking good faith, substantial steps
towards completion of a project that they believe will have use
to some users of the token beyond resale value or economic
income. Specifically, they are building and maintaining a
platform for purchasing air charter services that has value
beyond secondary trading of the tokens.139 Merely marketing
a digital asset as a “utility token” does not allow a promoter to
evade a determination that the asset is, in fact, a security. But
in applying the Substantial Steps Test, certain utility tokens
are certainly not securities and the SEC’s TKJ no-action letter
confirms this.

138 See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 375, 377 (2007).
139 TurnKey Jet No-Action Letter, supra note 50.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265295

No. 2:443]

A REGULATORY CLASSIFICATION OF DIGITAL ASSETS

489

3. Summary of Our Tests
Figure 2: A Summary of New Tests for Digital Assets
Howey
Element
Agency Costs v. (2)
“Solely
Decentralization through the
efforts
of
others”
Issue

Proposed
Test
Bahamas
Test

Investment
v. (3)
Substantial
Consumption
“Expectation Steps Test
of profits”

Examples
Currency,
bitcoin,
Ethereum,
Real
Estate,
Personal
Property
Tokens,
Real
Estate,
Personal
Property

There are two primary issues that motivate securities
regulation: “agency costs” and “investment versus
consumption.” The first issue goes to the possibility that
promoters will take advantage of investors, whether this
amounts to fraud or something short of fraud. This is the
“other peoples’ money” problem—when anyone turns over
money to someone else, the possibility exists that the recipient
will abuse the trust of the investor. Economists and lawyers
call this possibility an agency problem, and the costs
associated with it—costs of monitoring agents, bonding by
agents, and the inevitable wedge between interests of the
principal and the agent—“agency costs.”140 This issue is
addressed in the Howey test by the prong that triggers
securities regulation in cases when agency costs may be high.
When investors turn over their money to strangers with only
140 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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a promise in return, securities laws will generally apply.
When, however, investors are not held to the whim of the
promises of other individuals, the securities laws will
generally not apply. In such cases, the decentralization of the
system cuts strongly against treating investments as
securities.
The other issue is whether the thing being purchased for
value is for consumption purposes (as one buys a house or a
car) or for investment purposes (as one buys a stock or bond).
Although there are robust secondary markets for houses and
cars, these things do not become securities, and thus subject
to the jurisdiction of the SEC, simply because an individual
buys one with the sole intent of reselling it quickly for a profit.
The SEC has tried to draw the line instead based on whether
a piece of property, like a condo, is marketed for consumption
or rather as an alternative investment to the stock market.
The concern is that if investment opportunities are not
regulated, money will flow out of the stock market and into
real estate or other markets.
While marketing materials may be probative of whether a
digital asset is a security, those materials alone are
insufficient to make a determination, especially in the current
environment for digital assets. 141 Therefore, this Article
proposes a “Substantial Steps Test.” It focuses on whether the
digital asset is linked to an actual physical product or service,
such as computing power, consulting services, or the like. If it
is, then it follows that the digital asset looks more like a car
or a house, rather than a stock or bond. To avoid the empty
promise problem, this Article proposes that issuers of coins be
required to register their products or services with either the
SEC or an approved self-regulatory organization, and then
certify on an ongoing basis that they continue to take
substantial steps to develop the product or service.

141 See Chris Brummer, Trevor I. Kiviat & Jai Massari, What Should
Be Disclosed in an Initial Coin Offering?, in CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL AND
MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 13, 22),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293311
[https://perma.cc/V4ZR-3VW9]
(discussing disclosure generally).
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If the product or service failed or started to fail for business
reasons—that is, it was not a fraud related failure—the issuer
of the coin would not file an affidavit certifying the
Substantial Steps Test. This would likely have two impacts.
First, the coin would transition from being a simple piece of
property to being a security. This would mean any sale of it by
any person could not take place without registering the
security or having an exemption from registration, such as a
private placement pursuant to Regulation D. Second, the
trading value of the coin could fall to zero, since the
underlying business would no longer be viable as a means of
assessing the coin’s fundamental value.

4. A Note on Self-Regulatory Organizations
In several instances above, this Article has made reference
to a self-regulatory organization as a means of regulating
digital assets. As one of the authors has written elsewhere,
self-regulatory
organizations—such
as
FINRA
for
stockbrokers—are a potentially elegant solution to the
shortcomings of government regulation.142 A discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of SROs are beyond the scope
of this Article, but we believe an SRO would be a welcome
entity as a means of providing best practices or certification of
traders in this market. Additionally, in accordance with the
proposed solution, a SRO could act as a mechanism for
registration and certification of compliance with the
Substantial Steps Test. We expect that the SEC or other
government regulators would lurk in the background,
supervising any such SRO, as well as bringing civil or criminal
charges against fraudsters in digital asset markets, just as in
other markets.
As of this writing, there are discussions underway among
many major digital asset players to create a new selfregulatory organization for digital asset markets.143 Known
142 See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2013).
143 See, e.g., Nikhilesh De, CFTC Meeting Hears Renewed Calls for
Crypto Self-Regulation, COINDESK (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com
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as ADAM (Association for Digital Asset Markets), it would
promulgate a voluntary code of conduct, with the possibility of
evolving into a FINRA-like entity, or perhaps merely a
platform to inform government regulators.

V. CONCLUSION
The rise of digital assets, made possible by innovations
such as the distributed ledger and blockchains, poses a
significant challenge to government regulators. Digital assets
herald undeniable potential and risk. Because digital assets
as a category do not fit neatly into existing regulatory
buckets—currency, personal property, securities—but rather
span all of them, most jurisdictions have yet to develop
thoughtful regulation to create a fair and orderly market. This
regulatory lacuna perpetuates fraud and a market that is not
yet safe for institutional investors to enter with confidence. If
the potential of digital assets is to be realized, a trustworthy
infrastructure is needed.
A centerpiece of such a reliable infrastructure is a
characterization of digital assets that will enable both private
and public regulators, as well as entrepreneurs, investors, and
market makers, to know what they are dealing with. This
Article has attempted a very rough sketch of the types of
digital assets and how they fit into the existing legal tests for
what qualifies as a security. Different digital assets can be
analogized to currency, gold, or stock, to give just three
examples. Being able to differentiate among different types of
digital assets is vital for securities regulators, as well as other
government
entities.
The
implications
of
these
characterizations are far reaching—for instance, tax
treatment varies across asset classes in important ways.
For our purposes, we offer two tests—the Bahamas Test
and the Substantial Steps Test—as means of categorizing
digital assets as securities or not. With this stake in the
ground, we hope to encourage others to offer alternative tests

/cftc-meeting-hears-renewed-calls-for-crypto-self-regulation [https://perma
.cc/KGP2-V7FN].
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so the market can move towards a workable definition that
accounts for the unique promise and peril of digital assets.
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